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Appropriation and Redemption in 
Contemporary Western Discourses on 
Islam in Europe 
Luca Mavelli 
The aim of this paper is to sketch a line of interpretation of certain 
political-philosophical discourses on ‘Islam in Europe’ through the 
interrelated concepts of appropriation and redemption. Muslim presence 
in Europe is generally perceived as ‘problematic.’ A specific vocabulary, 
including terms like ‘liberal dilemma,’ ‘defense of freedom,’ ‘Muslim 
exceptionalism’, and ‘specification of acceptable boundaries,’1 
characterizes an academic production which has been particularly 
stimulated by the emergence of ‘crises’2 (the ‘Rushdie Affair,’ l’affaire du 
foulard, the French ban on headscarves in schools, and the publication of 
the ‘Danish cartoons,’ just to mention those that have hit the front pages 
of newspapers worldwide).3 Albeit in different ways, this scholarship has 
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displayed a certain agreement on the existence of a distinctive European 
tradition of liberal-secular humanism and on the idea that cultural and 
religious pluralism should be assessed against the necessity of preserving 
this tradition. The scope of this essay is to articulate a reflection on the 
assumptions (and ensuing implications) of this interpretive framework and 
thus contribute to fill a gap in the burgeoning and variegated literature on 
Islam in Europe. 
This literature, in fact, has been mostly concerned with the question of the 
transformation of Islam within European settings, namely whether, to 
what extent, and how European Muslims are undergoing—or should 
undergo—a process of individualization, secularization, and dislocation of 
traditional religious authority. Such a focus has had the effect of leaving 
the variable ‘Europe’ in the relation ‘Islam in Europe’ relatively under-
problematized and of framing the issue almost exclusively in terms of 
Muslim ‘integration into consolidated models of European secularity,’ as if 
such models represented an unsurpassed example of pluralism and 
neutrality.4 The aim of this paper is to shift the attention from Islam to 
Europe through an exploration of how the vindication of a distinctive 
European tradition of liberal-secular humanism is wielded to perpetuate 
dimensions of self-understanding and projection of differences, which 
nourish and reproduce the idea of a rift between Islam and Europe.  
The argument is that this dynamic is postulated upon an ontological 
essentialism of the kind expounded by Michel Foucault in his famous essay 
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‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.’5 In this essay, Foucault lays the 
foundations of his critical distinction between ‘genealogy’ and ‘traditional 
history’ and warns against the attempts of the latter ‘to capture the exact 
essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected 
identities.’ He maintains that this search ‘assumes the existence of 
immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and 
succession … [it] is directed to “that which was already there,”’ the image 
of primordial truth fully adequate to its nature and it necessitates the 
removal of every mask to ultimately disclose an original identity.6 In our 
case the ‘immobile forms’ are ‘the West’ and ‘Islam,’ which, as Armando 
Salvatore points out, tend to be conceived as two enclosed, self-
sustaining, and mutually exclusive kulturreligionen.7 These forms are the 
primary units of a debate strongly characterized by the problem of 
contending values, the latter being an expression of ‘an original identity.’ 
This essentializing ontology, Foucault contends, conceals a need for 
origins, a quest for reassurance about one’s own tradition, and a desire for 
a coherent and unitary identity. It expresses the necessity of dispelling the 
threatening idea that what one imagines as a clear and meaningful line of 
descent may just be the ‘unstable assemblage of faults, fissures, and 
heterogeneous layers.’8 Within this perspective, ‘to essentialize’ does not 
simply mean to construct interpretive frames of references that stabilize, 
congeal, and deform the Other. Indeed, to essentialize becomes a function 
of the self in which the will to knowledge cannot be separated from the 
will to master, which in turn is not independent from the will to define 
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one’s own subjectivity. Thus, following Foucault, the essentializing process 
can be defined as a cognitive mechanism in which the Other is 
purposefully constructed on the basis of subjective concerns.9 
The construction of Islam on the basis of European concerns is only one 
dimension of a more complex reality which sees sections of Muslims 
(living in Europe) performing a similar construction of ‘Europe’ from the 
perspective of an Islamic ideal-type or, even more interestingly, 
identifying with the ‘essentialized’—and often stigmatizing—image of 
Western/European origin. However, an inquiry into this interplay of 
‘imbalanced essentialisms,’10 although crucial for an understanding of the 
phenomenon of ‘Islam in Europe,’ cannot be pursued within the narrow 
‘European’ focus of this paper, concerned as it is with exploring how some 
contemporary Western academic discourses on Islam conceal a specific 
Western and European will to identity and distinction. In these discourses, 
it is argued, essentializing assumptions are enacted through the two 
interrelated discourses of appropriation and redemption.  
Appropriation addresses the need for origins and continuity by framing 
liberal-secularism as a unique Western achievement. This claim is made 
either by invoking the Christian roots of liberal-secular arrangements, or 
by referring to Europe’s historical and philosophical tradition and the role 
it has had in the process of emancipation from religious obscurantism. In 
this latter case, the modernizing character of liberal-secularism suggests 
the idea of a system that can be disentangled from a specific Christian 
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trajectory (thus made post-Christian) in order to deliver equality, freedom, 
and dignity to those who have not been educated in this tradition. This is 
the discourse of redemption—it encompasses and transcends the 
discourse of appropriation by vindicating the possibility, if not the 
necessity, of spreading the liberating and dignifying properties of Western 
liberal-secularism to Islam. 
In the next two sections I will analyze how discourses of appropriation and 
redemption are deployed by some prominent intellectuals debating Islam 
in Europe. The inquiry will be mostly devoted to unravelling the 
assumptions, implications, and limitations of their interpretive 
frameworks, sparing for the conclusion some proposals for alternative 
modes of interpretation. The narrow focus of the investigation, based on a 
discussion of a limited selection of academic-intellectual discourses, warns 
against generalizations. The relevance of the positions analyzed does not 
rest on their alleged hegemony at an academic or societal level. In order 
to make this case, in fact, it would be necessary to analyze how 
intellectual discourses are appropriated, transformed, reinterpreted, and 
disseminated at the level of social agency11—a task beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
Rather, drawing on Armando Salvatore, this paper takes academic-
intellectual perspectives on Islam in Europe to be relevant in themselves, 
because they represent a legitimizing discourse of those less theoretically 
refined, ‘sub-intellectual’ societal discourses and practices which cast 
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Muslims as the Other of Europe.12 The legitimizing strength of the 
intellectuals, ‘the stratum represented by the legitimate holders of the 
keys to sound knowledge and politics,’13 rests on their capacity to create 
a self-sustaining discursive space from which they can disappear by virtue 
of the intellectual function they perform, i.e, theoria—‘the contemplation 
that enable[s] the philosopher to distinguish the eternal truth of the 
cosmos from the uncertainty and the fluidity of quotidian life.’15 By 
considering the academic-intellectual as a legitimizing discourse of ‘sub-
intellectual’ societal discourses and practices, this paper ultimately 
focuses and elaborates on a very specific dimension of the conditions of 
existence of the discourse on Muslim Otherness—the space of 
legitimization granted by some academic-intellectual perspectives.  
 
Appropriation  
An interesting articulation of the discourse of appropriation is offered by 
the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor. According to Taylor, the 
question of whether Muslims can effectively separate religious belief and 
political commitments bears directly on the role and form that secularism 
should take in modern Western societies.16 Secularism, Taylor maintains, 
has its roots in Christianity, in the theological ‘requirement of distance, of 
non-coincidence between the Church and the world.’17 This principle has 
been further developed following the wars of religion when the necessity 
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of overcoming Christian sectarianism became paramount. The original 
idea of an ethic of peaceful coexistence based on elements common to all 
Christian doctrines (‘common ground strategy’) was quickly superseded by 
that of an ‘independent ethic.’18 The latter, which aimed at transcending 
confessional allegiances altogether, was based on an appeal to human 
nature and universalizable principles and had its most notable exponent in 
Grotius. The idea of an independent ethic was not synonymous with 
atheism. It demanded, however, that principles not be justified in religious 
terms.19 Such a secular independent ethic has been crucial in favoring the 
transition from traditional hierarchical societies, based on intermediate 
structures of mediation, to the direct-access society of modern nation-
states, because it has enabled the transfer of loyalties from the 
intermediate structures of the family, class, or religious confession to the 
nation-state.20 
These achievements notwithstanding, Taylor considers the form of 
secularism grounded in an independent ethic to be no longer capable of 
guaranteeing neutrality in Western societies. The polarization of believers 
and non-believers and, above all, the growing presence of non-Christians, 
most notably Muslims, have increasingly changed the meaning of the 
independent ethic, which has become synonymous with atheism. This of 
course dissatisfies Christian believers, but it is particularly problematic for 
Muslims, for whom secularism is an alien tradition.21 However, this 
argument should not automatically suggest the irreconcilability of Islam 
and secularism. On the contrary, Taylor argues, a modern form of 
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secularism is required more and more to avoid the marginalization of 
Muslims in contemporary Western societies. This mode of secularism 
cannot be based on an independent ethic, nor can it rest on a common 
ground strategy given the fundamental diversity of the traditions involved 
(Christianity and Islam). Taylor envisages the solution in a secularism of 
‘overlapping consensus’ in which the possibility of agreement on some 
political principles does not demand a parallel consensus on the 
underlying intuitions of values. Even this perspective needs some 
refinement in the face of today’s diversity. In Taylor’s interpretation, 
Rawls maintains that principles can be agreed to without sharing 
foundations, but also believes that what can be shared is the rationale for 
these principles—‘a doctrine of political constructivism, reasonable 
mutual expectations, and just terms of cooperation.’22 For Taylor, this is 
‘asking too much.’23 In today’s diverse societies the best we can aim for is 
agreement on some general principles, not on foundations, and most 
likely not on common frameworks.  
This brief summary of Taylor’s perspective on secularism offers an 
interesting illustration of how the logics of appropriation contribute to 
shape his views on the Muslim presence in the West. The idea that 
secularism is a unique Western achievement is expressed in the 
identification of a single point of origin, Christian theology, and a single 
line of development, the wars of religion. These elements are sufficient for 
Taylor to conclude that secularism is alien to Islam and from that to infer 
the radical diversity of the two traditions which demands an ‘overlapping 
9 
 
consensus’ where neither foundation nor common frameworks can be 
shared but only some general political principles. 
This argument is constructed upon an objectionable premise, namely the 
idea that secularism is uniquely Western because the differentiation of 
religious and secular spheres is an element of Christian theology. 
However, the fact that the term secularism has its ‘original etymological-
historical meaning … within medieval Christendom’ does not make the 
underlying process an exclusive feature of Christianity.24 In fact, although 
the Qur’an refers to some sort of indivisibility of religion and politics in 
more than forty passages, historical evidence shows that the two realms 
started to develop distinct spheres of experience not long after the death 
of the Prophet.25 Ira Lapidus articulates a detailed analysis of how the 
claim of the rulers of the Umayyad dynasty (661-750) to exercise political 
control over aspects of religious life was met with protests and triggered 
the growing awareness that an autonomous sphere for religious activity 
and organization was required in order to preserve its sacred, 
transcendent character.26 This awareness can be observed at an 
institutional level just three centuries after the birth of Islam. As Lapidus 
explains, 
[F]rom the middle of the tenth century effective control of the Arab-
Muslim empire had passed into the hands of generals, administrators, 
governors, and local provincial lords; the Caliphs had lost all effective 
political power. Governments in Islamic lands were henceforth secular 
regimes—Sultanates—in theory authorized by the Caliphs, but actually 
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legitimized by the need for public order. Henceforth, Muslim states were 
fully differentiated political bodies without any intrinsic religious character, 
though they were officially loyal to Islam and committed to its defense.27  
Philip Hitti suggests that the defense of Islam by Muslim states was not 
dissimilar to the defense of the Christian faith by European emperors.28 
Yet, Tamara Sonn highlights the difference between medieval 
Christendom and Islam in the tolerance granted to religious minorities and 
in the level of support that religious authority lent to authoritarian and 
oppressive regimes.29 The millet system (self rule for minority groups) of 
the Ottoman Empire, although considered by some as not living up to 
modern liberal standards,30 encompassed a dimension of religious 
tolerance which was unknown to a Europe scourged by the sectarianism 
of different Christian confessions. This element, together with the fact 
that, unlike in Christianity, ‘religious authorities were not affiliated with 
coercive power for the most part,’ probably made the separation between 
religion and politics a less important institutional, philosophical, and 
ethical concern.31 
This argument needs to be considered in relation to the specific sense that 
secularism acquired in Europe during the Enlightenment, namely freedom 
from belief. This meaning is not at all universal, not even in the West, as 
can be seen in the United States where secularism’s primary meaning is 
freedom of belief.32 These significations are related to the different 
histories of the two continents, with Europe crucially engaged in 
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emancipating itself from the coercive and oppressive power of the Church. 
If one accepts Taylor’s argument that a secular independent ethic has 
been crucial for the transition from traditional hierarchical societies to 
modern nation-states, one cannot help but notice how Western secular 
nation-states—and not religious Islamic institutions—became the primary 
source of oppression of Muslim societies through the process of 
colonization; how, in other words, if secularism represented for Europe 
the shifting of violence from religious wars into national and colonial 
wars,33 it represented for Muslims a symbol of oppression due to its 
identification with Western nation-states. 
Yet, to infer from this a general Muslim antipathy toward secularism—for 
instance, toward a secular independent ethic, as Taylor asserts34—would 
be unwarranted. Several studies on Muslim communities in Europe 
converge around the idea that Muslims are displaying a tendency toward 
the individualization or privatization of religious belief,35 one of the three 
dimensions of secularization according to the framework of José Casanova 
(the other two being the decline of religious beliefs and practices, and the 
differentiation of the religious and secular spheres).36 Interestingly, Taylor 
defines secularism only according to the latter dimension, which seems to 
lead to dynamics of individualization/privatization, hence the secular 
independent ethic of modern nation-states built on Christian roots. 
Following Taylor’s logic one may then expect a tendency to ‘secularize’ 
among Muslims living in Europe, and this is indeed a key feature that 
seems to emerge from the literature on Western European Islam. But 
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Taylor does not seem to take into account this possibility. For him, 
Muslims belong to a different religious tradition which not only prevents 
them from undertaking processes of individualization, but also constructs 
them almost exclusively as religious subjects. 
These brief socio-historical snapshots have no aim other than showing 
how the meaning, evolution, and reception of secularism are dependent 
on a variety of historical, social, and political circumstances which cannot 
be reduced to theological arguments. Hence, in a Foucauldian fashion, one 
might say that there is no historical necessity in Christian theology that 
has caused the regime of knowledge known as ‘secularism’ to gain 
widespread acceptance in Europe,37 but only a succession of historical 
contingencies that need to be analyzed, dissected, and carefully 
reconstructed if one wants to understand the implications of this regime 
for Muslims.38 
Following the theoretical framework sketched in the introduction it can be 
suggested that Taylor’s reliance on the classic Orientalist assumption 
which frames Islam as a cluster of absences39—thus making secularism an 
exclusive Western appropriation—should not be misread as an 
interpretive fallacy but as a will to identity and distinction. This will 
encompasses Taylor’s desire to preserve a Christian tradition in a liberal-
secular environment and is moderated by his renowned sensibility for the 
recognition of cultural diversity.40 Accordingly, Taylor’s reliance on an 
understanding of religion as an analytically identifiable category, 
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characterized by an autonomous essence, is not fortuitous.41 It allows 
him to satisfy ‘the liberal demand in our time that [religion] be kept quite 
separate from politics, law, and science—spaces in which varieties of 
power and reason articulate our distinctively modern life,’ and at the 
same time, to claim an unchanged vitality and importance for Christianity 
(and Islam).42 Yet, his concern for recognition of different cultures leads 
him to endorse a lighter version of Rawls’ paradigm as a way to overcome 
differences. The final effect is controversial as the very sources of (alleged) 
contention—Christianity and Islam—are removed from the debate in the 
public sphere. This is certainly coherent with Taylor’s understanding of 
these two traditions as transhistorical entities, but pays almost no 
attention to how European countries have achieved agreements on the 
role of religion in political life (with still harsh confrontations, and thus in a 
constant dynamic of renegotiation of the respective spheres of 
influence).43 These agreements, Alfred Stepan remarks, were the result of  
long public arguments and negotiations in which religion was the dominant 
item on the political agenda. Thus [for instance] in the Netherlands [at the 
beginning of the 20th century] … religious conflicts [among Catholics, 
Calvinists, and liberal-secularists] were eventually taken off the political 
agenda of majority decision-making by a democratic—but not liberal or 
secular—consociational agreement that allocated funds, spaces, and 
mutual vetoes to religious communities with competing comprehensive 
doctrines. Achieving such an agreement normally requires debate within 
the major religious communities. And proponents of the democratic 
bargain are often able to win over their fellow believers only by employing 
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arguments that are not conceptually free-standing but deeply embedded 
in their own religious community’s comprehensive doctrine.44 
Taylor’s endorsement of Rawls is thus controversial in that it denies 
Muslims living in the West the possibility to engage in that process of 
democratic confrontation and conflictual negotiations that has allowed 
Europe in its very recent past (and not just in the times of the wars of 
religion) to overcome the conflicts arising between Christian confessions 
and Christian and secular components. This position may be consistent 
with Taylor’s view, which deems secularism to be an exclusively Western 
feature, thus making the process of a democratic confrontation impossible 
if ‘Islamic’ arguments are to be brought into it. The problem with this 
perspective is that it suggests a fictionalized and depoliticized image of 
how different Christian confessions would have overcome their 
disagreements in more recent times—that is, by virtue of the adoption of 
an independent ethic, favored by a transfer of loyalties toward the nation-
state. This account glosses over the fragmentation which has 
characterized the Christian world. For instance, as Casanova points out, 
discourses on Catholicism, which characterized Anglo-Protestant societies 
in the United States from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth 
century, bear a certain resemblance to contemporary discourses on Islam 
as an illiberal and antimodern religion.45 Similarly, one might argue that 
some strands of the discourse which juxtapose Europe’s unitary Christian 
character against Islam are relatively recent and crucially linked to the 
project of European integration and the attempt to promote a specific 
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European identity.46 
Taylor’s desire to preserve an original identity for Christianity, and thus for 
Islam, together with an aspiration for a political system which may 
accommodate different traditions, leads him to endorse what we may 
label a ‘multiculturalism of necessity.’ In this account, culture is the 
inescapable context of subjectivity but also of government. As culture 
cannot be transcended, Taylor suggests, liberal-secularism, being an 
offspring of Western Christianity, must undergo a profound and necessary 
transformation if it is to make room for Muslims. What happens, though, if 
we assume that the cultural context may be transcended? 
 
Redemption  
Redemption occurs when liberal-secular arrangements, understood as an 
organic outgrowth of Western Christianity, are deemed to have acquired 
primacy over the cultural-religious dimension that generated them. This 
perspective subscribes to a polarized transition from a pre-modern to a 
modern status whereby the subject of a cultural-religious system (for this 
very reason subject to the practices that govern her life) becomes a 
liberated agent capable of assessing, questioning, and eventually opposing 
such a system of rules. In the discourse of redemption, the individual is 
thus redeemed from her state of submission to the inherited, hence not 
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consciously embraced, cobweb of cultural-religious prescriptions. 
Redemption, however, does not rest on a complete rejection of tradition. 
The primacy of liberal-secular norms over the Christian cultural-religious 
system from which they originated means that the former has 
domesticated and privatized the latter (it has become post-Christian), thus 
making it compatible with the dictates of reason and modern rationality. 
The unique feature of the discourse of redemption is that it makes 
possible the preservation of an organic link with tradition and at the same 
time allows its transcendence. The discourse of redemption subsumes the 
particularistic discourse of appropriation as it satisfies the Foucauldian 
need for origins and continuity, but also contains a universal discourse of 
liberation from the obscurantist aspects of tradition. 
In the discourse of redemption, the strength of liberal-secularism does not 
simply rest on its bearing a universal validity by virtue of being ‘the sole 
political doctrine that can harbor culture and religion without being 
conquered by them.’47 The strength of liberal-secularism as part of a 
universal discourse of redemption relies on the alleged fairness of its 
demands—it does not ask for a rejection of tradition, but only that it be 
contained within the discipline of liberal-secular norms—and on the moral 
authority of its proponent, the post-Christian West. The latter, in fact, 
does not couch its appeal in abstract universal principles, but refers to its 
concrete experience in the lengthy process of emancipation from the grip 
of cultural-religious oppression. By overlooking the possibility that this 
experience of religious oppression might not have been shared (not, at 
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least, in the same way) by other traditions such as Islam, the discourse of 
redemption asserts the moral authority of the post-Christian Western 
redeemer as universal. The post-Christian West has redeemed itself by 
gaining ascendancy over its kulturreligion through the adoption of liberal-
secular norms and, as such, it can now redeem Muslims who are still 
subjected to it. 
This perspective requires the construction of the subject of redemption as 
lacking agency as someone ‘whom culture has’ as opposed to a self-image 
of mastery and control of one’s own tradition.48 What type of social 
imaginary does this perspective enact? A vivid representation is offered by 
Mahmood Mamdani, for whom the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror,’ with its 
claims for the need to distinguish ‘good Muslims’ from ‘bad Muslims,’ 
rests on an implicit understanding of Muslims as unable to make culture, 
hence only capable of conforming to it. Muslim culture, Mamdani 
observes, 
seems to have no history, no politics and no debates. It seems to have 
petrified in a lifeless custom. Even more, [Muslims] seem incapable of 
transforming their culture, the way they seem incapable of growing their 
own food. The implication is that their salvation lies, as always, in 
philanthropy, in being saved from the outside.49  
In order to bring salvation, the post-Christian West endows itself with the 
possibility of inflicting suffering by inscribing it in a discourse of 
redemption enacted in the name of a doctrine, liberal-secularism, which 
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as the ultimate redemptive truth, promises deliverance from 
oppression.50 Although evidence of this argument is usually provided in 
relation to the ‘war on terror,’ strains of redemptive discourse in which 
suffering is alluded to and endowed with redemptive properties can be 
found in several arguments on Muslims in the West. Thus Brian Barry, in 
discussing the ‘Rushdie Affair,’ states that 
few people have ever been converted to or from a religion by a process of 
“examining beliefs critically.” Religious fanaticism is whipped up by non-
rational means, and the only way in which it is ever likely to be 
counteracted is by making people ashamed of it. If Christianity has in the 
past fifty years finally become compatible with civility (at least in most of 
Western Europe), that is the long-term consequence of an assault on its 
pretensions that got under way seriously in the eighteenth century. 
Gibbon employed the stiletto, while Voltaire resorted to the rapier. But in 
both cases the core of their deflationary strategy was mocking, ridiculing, 
and lampooning. Voltaire, however, lived openly at Ferney and died in old 
age of natural causes, even though religious zealots would have had no 
difficulty in assassinating him. The fate of Rushdie, forced to live in hiding 
with a price on his head, unfortunately suggests that the Islamic equivalent 
of Voltaire may still be some time off.51  
Barry vindicates the duty of liberal-secularism to redeem Islam by taking 
as a model the higher moral ground of Western Europe, which has 
domesticated Christianity, making it ‘compatible with civility.’ Muslim 
redemption, however, cannot be achieved by reasoned discussion, as the 
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irrationality of the pre-moderns makes any attempt at argumentation 
worthless. Hence the ‘mocking, ridiculing, and lampooning’ of Islam by 
Rushdie should be welcomed for its redemptive properties (and therefore 
should also be employed against Muslims who protested the publication 
of the Satanic Verses). In this framework, the question as to whether the 
Satanic Verses may have been offensive for Muslims to the point of 
causing suffering becomes irrelevant because Muslims have already been 
framed as moved by passionate, pre-modern, non-rational feelings. In 
such a scenario, suffering loses its original violence because it is self-
inflicted. If Muslims had a rational, privatized, and liberal-secular 
relationship with their religion, they would not be suffering. 
The discourse of redemption converts suffering into non-rational 
emotionality by virtue of its depoliticizing strength. As Wendy Brown 
points out, depoliticizing ‘involves removing a political phenomenon from 
comprehension of its historical emergence and from the recognition of the 
powers that produce and contour it,’ with the effect that ‘an ontological 
naturalness or essentialism almost inevitably takes up in our 
understanding or explanations.’52 The crucial implication of this 
essentialism/depoliticization is that ‘the field of political battle and 
political transformation is replaced with an agenda of behavioral, 
attitudinal and emotional practices.’53 Hence, the protests of Muslims are 
not instances of an effective anguish. They are the convulsions, the 
spasms of pre-modern manipulation or false consciousness from which 
the discourse of redemption promises to deliver them. Thus Brendan 
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O’Leary, in a recent debate on the Danish Cartoons published in 
International Migration,54 states that he feels sorry for the ordinary 
Muslims who were manipulated by the Danish Islamists, but the very fact 
that that they were manipulated leads him to question whether people 
were truly offended.55 
For O’Leary, ‘one should be vigorous in protecting liberalism and 
secularism in their established heartland,’ hence ‘no liberal principle 
should be sold now that might be regretted later.’56 This line of thought is 
shared by another participant in the debate, Randall Hansen, who, 
echoing Barry, vindicates the right to mock and ridicule religion, arguing 
that Muslims ‘have to decide whether they wish to live in a liberal 
democratic society,’57 and concludes that, in the face of increasing 
immigration, liberal-secularism, a ‘unique product of the West,’ should be 
strengthened rather than questioned.58 In Hansen’s view, the ultimate 
redemptive truth of Western liberal-secularism can dispense its liberating 
properties as long as it remains untouched, which means not only that 
Muslims do not have the chance to negotiate the terms of their 
integration,59 but more importantly that they have no contribution to 
offer to Europe’s democratic development. 
This line of argument, which casts Muslims as the ultimate Other of 
European liberal-secular modernity, rests on a liberal-secular reductionism 
which, by equating ‘freedom to rights, and … equality to equal standing 
before the law, … eliminates from view many sources of subordination, 
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marginalization, and inequality that organize liberal democratic societies 
and fashion their subjects.’60 This reductionism can assume a legalistic 
form. Thus, for instance, O’Leary states that ‘to publish mockery of 
Muhammad in an outlet not noted for its Muslim consumers was well 
within the newspaper’s rights (and indeed public manners) both under 
Danish law and under the European Convention. Liberal rights also permit 
public relations stunts.’61 Yet liberal reductionism can also emerge as a 
comparative argument. A well-known case is that of British historian David 
Irving who, in the days of the row over the Danish cartoons, was on trial 
(and later sentenced to a jail term) in Austria on charges of Holocaust 
denial. This event has led some commentators to raise the question of 
whether Europe was using double standards by forbidding the freedom of 
expression of those who deny the Holocaust and allowing the free speech 
of those who offend and ridicule the Prophet. A very telling reply to this 
argument has come from French philosopher André Glucksmann who, in 
an article entitled ‘Separating Truth and Belief,’ has recalled how ‘the 
distinction between fact and belief is at the heart of Western thought.’62 
This distinction, he claims, should not be questioned, because it is through 
the very recognition of the cruelty of the past, specifically the ‘Nazi 
abominations,’ that Europe has been capable of progress toward 
democracy. Mixing facts and interpretation (religious beliefs), hence 
putting on the same level those who deny the Holocaust and those who 
poke fun at Islam, risks heralding us into either fanaticism or nihilism.63 
The thread that links these arguments, from Barry to Glucksmann, is only 
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formally Islam in the European setting. Even a cursory look shows how the 
discussion revolves around the self-understanding of Europe, in a will to 
identity and distinction. Liberal-secular Europe becomes the redeemer; it 
has suffered under the sway of religion but has ultimately succeeded in 
democratizing Christianity, making of it a source of moral value. It has 
overcome the horrors of the Second World War by keeping alive its 
memory with a system of knowledge which distinguishes between facts 
and beliefs. It has developed a system of legal protection beyond that of 
individual states. As a counterpoint, Muslims are those to be redeemed. 
They fall victim to their uncontrolled passions; they are subject to 
manipulation, unable to distinguish between facts and beliefs.  
The discourse of redemption makes liberal-secular Europe an inescapable 
yardstick for every analysis of Islam in Europe. The effect is that Islam 
becomes a projection of Europe, incapable of an autonomous life, unable 
to express an original identity and impossible to evaluate without 
reference to the European standard. This dynamic can be observed also in 
‘sympathetic’ analysis of a more socio-anthropological character. In the 
previous section, I mentioned that several scholars consider the 
‘individualization of religious beliefs as the major development in Europe’s 
Muslim communities.’64 A strong proponent of this argument is Jocelyne 
Cesari who contends that the arrival of Muslims in the pluralistic context 
of Europe is leading to the emergence of the ‘Muslim individual,’ thus 
engendering a transformation which has not yet reached Muslim 
countries.65 Hence, she suggests, the ‘social adaptation process of Muslim 
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minority groups has placed Islam within the three interrelated paradigms 
of secularization, individualization, and privatization, which have until 
recently been distinctive characteristics of Western societies.’66 The 
sociological analysis may be well-grounded, but one cannot help but 
notice how, even in this case, Muslims are being redeemed by embracing 
features which are deemed exclusively Western, most notably the process 
of subjectivity formation which, in a classic Orientalist formulation, is 
deemed an exclusive prerogative of Western Christianity.67 As in the 
previous examples, Europe is once again taken as the normative yardstick, 
the measure of every civilizing process.68 From this perspective, the 
divide between Europe and Islam is transformed into a divide between 
‘Muslim beliefs and practices in Europe and those in the migrants’ 
countries of origin.’69 The discourse of redemption redraws the circle of 
otherness and reiterates the distinction between ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad 
Muslims,’ leaving a glimpse of hope for those who, having ventured to 
Europe, will not resist its civilizing strength, allowing the individual to 
emerge and soar over the suffocating ‘bad Islam.’  
 
 
Conclusion 
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This paper has examined the discourses of appropriation and redemption 
as categories that may account for some contemporary 
Western/European attitudes toward Islam in Europe. What has emerged 
from this brief analysis is how certain intellectual-academic inquiries into 
Islam in the West/Europe may conceal a Western/European will to 
identity and distinction. In a Foucauldian reading this tendency would 
express a demand for ontological reassurance about one’s own being, 
tradition, and identity, hence the will to stabilize, by means of 
appropriation and redemption, the purity, originality, and continuity of 
liberal-secular forms as generated by a Christian, now post-Christian, 
Europe. As we have observed, both appropriation and redemption rest on 
an essentializing ontology—the former grounded in a notion of communal 
differences, the latter based on the depoliticization of differences. Despite 
this similarity and despite the fact that the discourse of redemption tends 
to subsume that of appropriation, the two discourses have very different 
implications for the way they conceptualize Islam and the relationship 
between non-Muslims and Muslims. 
In the discourse of appropriation, the Muslim subject is simply unknown. 
The only information available is that s/he is non-secular and non-
Christian, but these features, which mark the identity of the Western 
subject, are not a reason, at least not in Taylor’s approach, to claim that 
Muslims should adjust to non-Muslims without reciprocity.70 Taylor looks 
for mediation, for a mutually respectful accommodation which may do 
justice to the differences at stake. The result is a painful ‘multiculturalism 
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of necessity,’ which raises doubts as to how it could ever work. Why 
should an overlapping consensus be sought if the differences are as radical 
as Taylor claims? On what grounds could one justify a form of civic 
coexistence between perspectives that can never meet? Why should we 
live together? The problem with Taylor’s account is that it establishes 
radical diversities as ontological units of analysis and then tries to mediate 
between them. As the brief analysis developed in this article exposes, the 
employment of a universal understanding of secularism as an exclusive 
feature of Christian Europe overlooks how similar practices may have 
been experienced in the ‘Muslim world’—a world whose history, 
philosophy, and social processes have not developed in uncontaminated 
isolation from those of ‘the West’ (and vice-versa). 
This argument does not simply suggest the presence of similarities and 
mutual influences between the two worlds but points to the existence and 
consolidation of what Salvatore identifies as a specific space of 
transnational communication between ‘the West’ and ‘Islam.’71 This 
space has been mostly filled with Orientalist assumptions which, at least 
from Max Weber onwards, have been endowed with a social-scientific 
status.72 When proponents of a discourse of redemption reduce events 
like the ‘Rushdie affair’ or the ‘Danish cartoons’ to a question of freedom 
of expression versus the legal protection of a minority (and maybe 
conclude with the call for a Muslim Enlightenment), they are not simply 
essentializing Muslims in a typical Orientalist fashion or restating their will 
to identity and distinction as Westerners and Europeans. What they are 
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doing is dehistoricizing and depoliticizing the event under scrutiny by not 
considering at all the possibility that their judgment and their perspectives 
on such controversies, rather than being the pure outcome of liberated 
rational minds, may reflect a deeply rooted tradition of Orientalism, which 
continues to survive unabated in the historical and political space of 
transnational communication between ‘the West’ and ‘Islam.’ 
One does not have to share the Foucauldian assumption of pervasiveness 
of discourse to entertain this argument. As aptly argued by Norbert Elias, 
the Cartesian presumption of a knowledge contained by a totally 
independent individual, a knowledge that is reinvented from scratch with 
every newborn, is part of the myth of emancipation of modernity.73 Our 
knowledge is already part of a stream of knowledge which provides 
epistemological frameworks. This does not mean that we lack the capacity 
to challenge deep-seated assumptions. However, what is required for this 
enterprise is ‘detachment.’74 Contrary to what conventional wisdom may 
suggest, the traditional problem of social science—the fact that the agent 
of investigation is also the object of investigation—has not improved with 
time. On the contrary, while human beings have acquired increasing 
control over natural events and are thus able to experience greater 
detachment in the exploration of natural phenomena, the very same 
empowerment of human beings has lead to greater uncertainty in the 
social world and in the capacity to understand and control human-made 
tragedies such as wars, violence, ethnic cleansing, and terrorism.75 
According to Elias, the level of involvement in social science has increased, 
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and increasing involvement has led to a shortening of the time 
perspective. A concern for the present makes us unable to discern that 
what we experience today is the result of long-term processes, and the 
need for reassurance about our identity makes us unable to break with 
conventional chains of interpretation. The discourse of redemption can 
thus be considered an illustration of this Eliasian intuition. In a self-
deceptive reversal and communal projection, Muslims become the 
‘involved,’ those who succumb to uncontrolled passions, whereas the 
Western liberal-secular observer is the ‘detached,’ intent on skimming the 
good from the bad in the interest of a more civilized society. 
Elias’s argument confronts us with the possibility that challenging the 
discourses of appropriation and redemption may demand detachment. 
This means considering the possibility that assumptions of moral 
superiority may be linked to higher power ratios,76 that there may be no 
self-contained and self-sufficient line of historical development, that the 
discourse of uncontaminated origins may just be a myth, and that the 
rules which a system has produced may be best understood as a common 
heritage and as such, they can be seized, replaced, and exposed in their 
conflictual meaning by those considered to be Other.77 Challenging the 
discourses of appropriation and redemption may indeed require a 
considerable effort as it demands coming to terms with the very 
emotionality, or the ‘involvement,’ that the discourse of modernity has 
striven to portray as a remnant of the past.

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